Citing unfair treatment and profit distribution, three of EXO’s Chinese members-Kris, Luhan, and Huang Zitao aka Tao-all left the group in 20. But perhaps the most instructive example has been the saga around SM’s 12-piece boy band EXO, which debuted in 2012 to phenomenal popularity across Asia and singlehandedly blew open the door for Korean idol culture in China thanks to the group’s Mandarin-language subunit, EXO-M, which sang Chinese-language versions of the groups’ hits and made overnight sensations out of Chinese members Lu Han aka Luhan and Wu Yifan aka Kris. Only a year after his debut, Super Junior-M member Han Geng sued SM for unfair distribution of profits and left the group.

So it was hardly surprising when SM’s bid at localization got off to a rocky start.

In such an environment, exploitation abounds, and financial and legal disputes are common. Once they’ve signed exclusive contracts with an agency-typically seven to 10 years-trainees move into company dormitories and spend the next several years undergoing a rigorous program of training in singing, dance, public speaking, and languages before-if they are fortunate-they’re selected to debut as part of an idol group. Much as in midcentury Hollywood and the studio system, the Korean pop industry is dominated by a handful of agencies that recruit and train young talent. The first generation of Chinese starlets in Seoul came into an idol talent system often as ruthless and focused as Olympic training back in China. This tactic was pioneered by SM Entertainment, South Korea’s largest and most infamously exploitative K-pop agency, which debuted a Mandarin-speaking subunit of its hit boy group Super Junior in 2008. The Korean music industry started recruiting Chinese idol trainees toward the end of the last decade, hoping that Chinese idols and Mandarin-language songs would help win over China’s growing consumer class. Unlike Hollywood, whose efforts to incorporate Chinese stars, such as in the dire film The Great Wall, have largely flopped, Korean labels have pushed hard to draw talent out of China. This is because an increasing number of K-pop idols are Chinese. But if Seoul pisses off Beijing again-say, if Korean companies stop selling memory chips to Huawei-a complete ban on hallyu will be harder this time around. Hallyu’s fate looks shaky as China becomes increasingly paranoid about foreign influence and censorship tightens by the month. The ban has since eased a little, but even after the thaw, no major Korean group has been invited to perform in the country. But they suffered an equally dramatic fall when South Korea’s decision to cooperate with the United States to build the THAAD missile defense system, which China sees as a threat to its security, resulted in an abrupt ban on hallyu imports for two years-leaving Chinese fans to take overseas trips to see their favorite idols. Korean wave ( hallyu) products like K-pop and K-dramas became enormously popular in China earlier this decade, driven by relatively open international exchange and the growth of a sizable urban middle class with disposable income. Korea’s economy is already suffering significantly due to the slowdown in the global supply chain.īut aside from semiconductors, smartphone chips, and petrochemicals, the fate of South Korea’s most famous export-K-pop, or Korean pop-hangs in the balance. The United States and China are South Korea’s two largest trading partners, with more than 25 percent of Korean exports going to China and another 12 percent to the United States. As the U.S.-China trade war enters its second year with no sign of a deal, one heavily export-reliant Asian economy finds itself caught squarely in the middle: South Korea.

Korean idol manager self defense